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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellee The Salt Lake County Firemen's Civil Service
Commmission (the "Commission") submits that the proper statement
of this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal is found at Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (b) (1996), not at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (a) (1996) as is alleged by appellant James R. Collins
("Collins").
The section that Collins relies on provides this Court with
jurisdiction over "the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudactive proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudacative proceedings of
the agencies . . .." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (emphasis
added).

This section does not apply to the current case.

Collins is appealing from district court review of a formal
adjudacative proceeding before the Commission, which is not an
agency of the state, but rather of Salt Lake County, a political
subdivision of the state.
Because the Commission is a County agency and because
Collins is appealing from district court review of the
Commission's adjudicative proceedings, the proper source for this
Court's jurisdcition is found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (b)
which provides that this Court has jurisdiction over "appeals
form the district court review of (i) adjudacative proceedings of

1

agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies . . . . "

The Commission submits that this section

describes the proper foundation of this Court's appellate review
of this case, rather than the section cited by Collins.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The Commission does not dispute

Collins' characterization

of any of the issues on appeal except that in the last issue that
he raises, the Commission submits that the wrong standard of
review is utilized.
The Commission submits that this issue is governed by the
standard of review in Tolman
P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991).

v.

Salt

Lake

County

Attorney,

818

In that case this Court stated that,

"under Rule 65B, this court looks at the administrative
proceedings as if the petition were brought here directly, even
though technically it is the district court's decision that is
being appealed."
Comm'n,

Id.

at 26 (citing Erkamn

198 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1948) .

v. Civil

Service

"This court gives no

deference to the district court's initial appellate review since
it was a review of the record, which this court is just as
capable of reviewing as the district court."

Id.

(Citations

ommitted).
The Commission agrees with Collins that the proper standard
under which htis court should review the Commission's findings of
fact is the substantial evidence test.

2

RELEVANT STATUTORY AND RULE PROVISIONS
With the exception of Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Commmission agrees that Collins has provided this
Court with all the relevant statutory provisions on this appeal.
The text of those rules are laid out in the Addendum to this
brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case:
The Commission agrees with the bulk of Collins' statement of
the nature of this case.

It must be noted however, that this

case was before the district court pursuant to Rule 65B of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Course of Proceedings Below.
On or about July 5, 1988, Appellant James R. Collins
("Collins") filed a grievance with the Salt Lake County Firemen's
Civil Service Commission ("Commission").

(R. 673). In this

grievance Collins challenged three specific sections of an
examination that the Commission had given in January of that
yearto establish the promotion register for the position of
Battalion Chief within the Salt Lake County Fire Department.
00675).
1988.

(R.

A hearing was held before the Commission on July 20,
(R. 678). Collins was represented by legal counsel, Duane

R. Smith, Esq. represented Collins at that hearing.
3

(R. 679).

After the hearing (R. 680-839), the Commission issued its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, on August 18,
1988. (R. 886-899).

In its decision, the Commission found that

there was no "reasonable basis for overturning the results of the
examination and . . . [held] that the examination results and
promotability register be affirmed."

(R. 898).

Collins then filed a verified Complaint in district court on
September 16, 1988. (R. 1-10).

In this complaint, Collins

asserted that jurisdiction in the district court was pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 17-28-13. (R. 2 ) .

In response, the Commission

filed a Motion to Dismiss the action on September 23, 1988.

This

motion was based on the Commission's belief that Utah Code Ann. §
17-28-13 did not provide any basis for district court review of
the Commission hearing.

(R. 3 0-37).

In a Minute Entry dated October 7, 1988, the district court,
per Judge Scott Daniels, denied the defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. (R. 62). This Minute Entry was more fully explained in
an order dated January 12, 1989.

In which the district court

explained that Collins' remedy was u by way of a writ of Mandamus
pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(2)."

(R. 85). The court further added:

"That pursuant to Rule 65B, the inquiry by this court shall be
limited to a determination of whether or not the Fire Civil
Service Commission abused its discretion or exceeded its
authority."

(Id.).

Collins made no objection to this order.

Rather he amended his complaint to assert jurisdiction pursuant
to that subdivision of that rule. (R. 65).
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On April 21, 1989, the Commission filed a general objection
to Collins' Request for Interrogatories.

(R. 92-96).

The

Commission stated that all the documents requested by Collins
were beyond the scope of review of an action pursued through Utah
R.Civ. P. 65B(b)(2).

(R. 92-93).

a Motion to Compel Discovery.

On May 22, 1989, Collins filed

(R. 102-113). Accompanied by

Memorandum of Support. (R. 97-101).

a

In that Memorandum, Collins

acknowledged that the jurisdiction of the district court was
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 65B(b)(2).

(R. 97-98).

However, Collins

also declared that the "position taken by Plaintiff is that
Defendants in administering a promotional examination which is
blatantly discriminatory and biased, have thereby exceeded their
jurisdiction and have not "regularly pursued [their] authority.'"
(R. 98).
On May 25, 1989, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
defendant Larry Hinman.

(R. 135). On this same date, the

Commission also filed a Motion to Define the Scope of Review.
(R. 137). The Commission again argued that the district court's
scope of review in the case was "limited to an examination of the
certified record of the proceedings, below."

(R. 138). By Minute

Entry on June 23, 1989, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Hinman and took under advisement the other motions.
(R. 145).

In another Minute Entry dated November 7, 1989, the

judge ruled that "Plaintiff is entitled to prove that the
decision of the Salt Lake County Firemen's Civil Service
Commission was capricious, arbitrary, or beyond its
5

jurisdiction."

(R. 146). The court therefore granted Collins'

motion to compel.

(Id.)

The next entry on the record was recorded almost two years
later on October 31, 1991.

On that date, the district court

issued, sua sponte, an Order to Show Cause why the matter should
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

(R. 152) . A second

show cause order was issued from the district court on January 8,
1992.

(R. 156). On January 22, 1992 a Notice of Entry of

Appearance of Counsel was filed for Collins.

(R. 158).

On

January 29, 1992 the Commission filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute, accompanied by supporting memorandum.
160-171) .

This motion was opposed by Collins.

(R.

(R. 174-234) .

About this time, the continuing disagreement between the
parties concerning discovery and the scope of review began again
on March 26, 1992.

On that date, Collins filed anoLher Motion to

Compel discovery accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in support thereof. (R. 238-246).

In that

Memorandum, Collins characterized the issue before the court as
"whether or not [the Commission] acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in the examination of James R. Collins for Battalion
Chief."

(R. 244).

On July 10, 19 92 the Commission filed a Motion to Set Aside
and Objection to the Order (R. 273-274) and an accompanying
Memorandum in support thereof.

(R. 275-285).

In that

Memorandum, the Commission asserted that the Order to Compel
Discover should not have been granted without the court having

6

ruled on the Commission's Motion to Dismiss.

(R. 278-279). The

Commission again argued that the case should have been dismissed
for failure to prosecute.
motion.

(R. 286-289).

(R. 279-282).

Collins opposed this

In his Memorandum Collins characterized

his action as one "to seek a declaration of this Court that the
Salt Lake County Firemen's Civil Service Commission abused is
discretion and/or exceeded its authority in the creation of and
administration of a Battalion Chief promotional examine (sic)
administered in January, 1988."

(R. 286).

In a Minute Entry

dated September 24, 1992, the court, per Judge Iwasaki, denied
the Commission's Motion to Set Aside the Discovery Order.

(R.

300) .
The next significant entry in the record is a Motion,
accompanied by a memorandum, filed by the Commission on July 29,
1994, to Limit the Court's Review.

(R. 349-362).

The Commission

argued that the proper scope of the court's review on a Rule 65B
action such as Collins' was limited to an examination of the
record in the hearing below.

(Id.)

In Collins' opposition

memorandum to this motion (R. 3 63-393), he argued that he was
entitled to de novo review before the district court

(R. 367-

371), and that the interests of justice so demanded.

(R. 371-

374).

The Commission replied, again asserting its argument that

Rule 65B limited the review to one on the record.

(R. 394-399).

The district court entered the following order after considering
the motion:
1.

The July 20, 1988 hearing before the Salt

7

Lake County Firemen's Civil Service Commission is
considered to be a formal proceeding by the Court.
2.

Rule 65(b) [sic] of the Rules of Civil

Procedure, however, provides the Court with the
opportunity to provide equitable remedies to an
aggrieved party and although the Court will, for the
most part, conduct the review of the Firemen's Civil
Service Commission proceedings as an appellate Court,
it will examine issues of due process violations, and
will allow some de novo testimony regarding facts in
dispute.
3.

Those facts in dispute are the authorship and

administration of the Battalion Chief exam in
controversy, as well as the statements of Defendant
Larry Hinman and the Salt Lake County Personnel
Director J.D. Johnson regarding exams as set forth and
contained in a video tape which was transmitted to
Firefighter's in Salt Lake County.
4.

As a consequence, the Court will examine such

statements when considering issued of proper
administration of the test, abuse of discretion, and
whether or not the Civil Service Commission failed to
act as required by statute.

(R. 407).

8

On August 28, 1995, the Commission filed a Motion to Dismiss
with accompanying memorandum. (R. 438-480).

The Commission

argued that Collins had failed to name necessary and
indispensable parties to the action.

(R. 444-450).

The basis of

this argument was that the other candidates to the exam who had
been promoted from the certified register established by the 1988
exam had due process rights that would be affected by any
decision of the Court affecting the 1988 exam.

(Id.).

Collins filed an Opposition Memorandum to this motion on
September 8, 1995.

(R. 481-508).

In that Memorandum, Collins

contended that the other parties were not necessary because
complete relief could be granted Collins without the other
candidates being named.

Specifically, Collins asserted that any

action decertifying the results of the exam, or demoting any
current Battalion Chiefs was mooted by the January 12, 1989
decision of Judge Daniels.

(R. 486). Collins acknowledged that

the remedy he sought from the Commission was promotion to the
rank of Battalion Chief and back pay from 1988.

(Id.).

In its Reply Memorandum on this motion filed on September
13, 1995, the Commission argued that the relief requested by
Collins could not be granted by the Commission.

(R. 509-512).

The Commission contended that it could not be ordered t i promote
Collins or give him back pay because both of those remedies were
beyond the statutory authority of the Commission.

(R. 509-511).

The Court in an Order dated October 11, 1995, denied the
Commission's Motion to Dismiss.

(R. 516). The Court further

9

ordered that "Collins' requested remedies of promotion and back
pay shall not be considered at trial, but the court may remand
these issues with directions to the Fire Civil Service
Commission."

(Id.).

The Court then ordered that Collins was

limited to calling two witnesses at trial.

(R. 517).

The case came on for hearing before Judge Iwasaki on October
13, 1995.

(R. 564-590). At the hearing, the Court indicated that

it was familiar with the record below.

(R. 565-566).

The court

allowed the testimony of two witnesses, Larry Hinman, the former
Chief of the Salt Lake County Fire Department, (R. 568-578); and
Clare Rasmussen, a former member of the Commission (R. 578-581).
After hearing argument and the testimony , the district court
denied Collins' appeal in its Findings of Fact and Decision,
dated November 17, 1995.

(R. 550-556).

Specifically, the Court found:
16. The Court finds n[T]hat its review is of the
record with additional testimony for a limited purpose
and not a trial de novo. The record below is reviewed
to determine if the Fire Civil Service Commission
abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction.
The Court finds that the decision of the Fire Civil
Service Commission of August 18, 1988 was rational and
reasonable.
17. The Court, in its review of the record, gives
great deference to the findings of fact contained in
the decision of August 18, 1985. The decision
contained substantial facts that were supported by the
record and the Court finds no abuse of discretion by
the Fire Civil Service Commission in reaching its
decision.
18. The Court finds that the Administrative
Hearing process conducted by the Fire Civil Service
Commission, although not perfect, was fair and not
unconstitutional.
•

20.

•

#

•

The Court finds that the Fire Civil Service
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Commission decision on May 25, 1995 concerning
discovery requests by the plaintiff were rational and
reasonable."
(R. 554) .
Collins then filed this appeal.
C. Statement of the Facts.
1.

Appellant Collins is currently and was in 1988, a Captain

with the Salt Lake County Fire Department.
2.

In January of 1988, then Chief Larry Hinman requested,

pursuant to statute and policy that the Salt Lake County
Firemen's Civil Service Commission prepare a promotional register
for the position of Battalion Chief (R. 30).
3.

In response to that request, the Commission administered an

examination to eight candidates seeking promotion to that rank.
(R. 31).
4.

The exam consisted of five competitive portions.

(R. 887).

5.

The exam also considered the seeniority of the candidates.

(Id.)

.

6.

The five competitive portions of the exam were as follows:

(1) a written exercise, worth 20% of the weight of the exam; (2)
a Department Promotability rating, worth 3 0% of the total weight
of the exam; (3) Fire Simulation Problem, worth 2 0%; (4) an
individual oral interview worth 15%; and (5) a leaderless group
discussion, worth 15%. (R. 887-888).

The final possible 10% of

the exam was from the seniority rating. (R. 588).
7.

Collins grieved three specific portions (the promotability,

11

fire simulation and written exercise) to the Commission.

He felt

hose sections M i d not comply with § 17-28-7, Utah Code
Annotated, which requires that such examination shall be 'public,
competitive and fair' and that such examination 'shall fairly
test the fitness in every respect of persons examined'".

(R.

675) .
The specific allegations that Collins made regarding the
examination were as follows.
8.

He challenged that because the evaluators of these three

sections were members of the fire department they were biased.
Collins contended that they were especially biased against him
because none of the evaluators had "specific, first hand and
current knowledge regarding [Collins7] performance."
9.

(R. 675).

He challenged the promotability section of the exam,

claiming that the personnel file used by the evaluators did not
include evidence of the periodic merit ratings he was given
during his years of employment.
10.

(R. 675).

Collins further alleged that irregularities had taken place

in the fact sheets which candidates had filled out for inclusion
in their files and were improperly received.
11.

(Id.)

(R.675).

Because of these supposed irregularities, Collins felt that

the promotability portion of the exam was based on "subjective
and irrelevant criteria which prevented a competitive test fairly
evaluating the skills of the participants."
12.

(Id.)

(R. 675).

Collins believed that his score on the fire simulation

exercise was lowered because he failed to completely fill out an
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organizational structure for the simulated incident.

He further

claimed that his score should not have been lowered because Salt
Lake County Fire Department Policy expressly stated that filling
out such charts in a fire incident was optional.
13.

(R. 675-6).

Collins objected to the written section of the exam on three

distinct grounds:
a.

First, Collins charged that the problem was

not new and, therefore, five of the candidates had
prior exposure to the question, whereas Collins had not
been exposed to it.
b.

Second, Collins challenged that the exercise

was not hypothetical, but rather was based on actual
events within the Fire Department.

Collins asserted

that this resulted in two of the evaluators not being
able to objectively review Collins solution to the
problem because they were biased by their own handling
of the situation.
c.

(Id.).

Finally, Collins complained that uthe

guidelines given the evaluators [do] not match the
criteria given to the participants for the exercise."
(R. 676) .
14.

Collins believed that some of the candidates had been

improperly "prepped" for the exam.
15.

A hearing on this grievance was heard before the Commission

on July 20, 1988.
16.

(Id.).

(R. 678).

At this hearing, Collins was represented by legal counsel,
13

Duane P. Smith.
17.

Collins' counsel specifically stated in the hearing that "we

appeal not the entire test, but we appeal only from certain
sections
18.

of the test."

(R. 683).

Collins' attorney also stated that "we will limit our appeal

today and our discussion today to only those [sections discussed
above]."
19.

(Id.).

Collins' attorney admitted that they were "guessing" about

his allegation that the command organizational chart was a factor
in his receiving a low score on the fire simulation exercise.
20.

In sworn testimony before the Commission, Assistant Chief

Robert Swenson testified that the reason the merit ratings were
removed from every candidates' personnel file for the
promotability portion of the exam was that the experience in the
department was that such ratings were unreliable.
21.

(R. 753-754).

The Commission also heard testimony from Mr. Swenson that he

wrote the fire simulation problem and that Mr. Jim Christiansen
wrote the grading guidelines for that problem after the two had a
meeting to discuss the problem.

Moreover, Mr. Swenson testified

that those two also met with the full evaluation panel to review
the grading criteria.
22.

(R. 755-758) .

Mr. Swenson also testified that if a candidate did not fill

out the organizational chart the candidate's score would not
suffer.
23.

(R. 758-760) .

Mr. Swenson, on cross examination, testified that he

believed that the evaluators had sufficient knowledge to fairly

14

judge all the candidates on the promotability portion of the
exam.

(R. 765). Mr. Swenson believed this because of the length

of service all the candidates had with the department, and the
relatively small number of captains and battalion chiefs in the
department.

(R. 765-66).

Mr. Jim Christiansen testified under sworn testimony as follows:
24.

He testified that there was a long standing policy of not

using any candidates7 merit ratings in determining that
candidates' promotability score.
unreliability of such ratings.
25.

This was due to the
(R. 770-771).

He testified that he believed, given all the factors, that

the composition of the promotability board was fair.

(R. 772-

775) .
26.

He testified that under the evaluation guide for the fire

simulation exercise, whether or not a candidate filled out an
organizational chart was irrelevant to that candidate's rating.
(R. 781-782).
27. He testified that the written problem was the same problem
from 1986, and that indeed, five of the eight participants had
seen the problem before.
28.

(R. 783).

However, he also testified that both the County Fire

Department and the Sheriff's Office had often used the same
questions on subsequent exams.
this practice.
29.

There was no perceived bias in

(R. 784).

Moreover, Mr. Christiansen testified that the scores on the

written exam for the five repeat candidates, on a whole, were

15

lower the second time they were exposed to the question.

(R.

785) .
30.

The first time candidates, as a whole, scored higher than

the repeat candidates on the written exercise.
31.

(R. 784-788).

He testified that the exam was designed to test as many

areas of knowledge and skill as possible and that it is not
uncommon in these exams for a candidate to do well in certain
areas of the test and poorly in others.
32.

(R. 788-790).

This would explain the relatively minor differences between

Collins' scores on the portions of the exam graded by evaluators
from outside the department, which were both oral interviews,
with his lower scores on inside evaluated portions, which tested
different skills.
33.

(R. 790).

Mr. Christiansen testified that the written exercise problem

from the exam had originally been developed for a California
police department's sergeant exam.
34.

(R. 790-791).

He testified that any similarity between the problem and any

incident in the Fire Department was purely coincidental.

(R.

791) .
35.

Mr. Christiansen expressed his opinion that the scoring

guidelines for the written exercise were fair because

u

it was the

kind of problem that alternate solutions or conclusions may have
been equally good."

(R. 797-798).

Commission's findings of

fact, conclusions of law and decision dated August 18, 1988.

(R.

886-898) .
36.

After hearing all this testimony, the Commission ruled that

16

there was competent evidence to "conclude that each separate
phase, and the examination in its entirety, meets the statutory
requirement that it shall be 'public, competitive and free' and
'shall fairly test the fitness in every respect of the persons
examined.'" (R. 897-898).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Commission asserts that there has been no error in the
dsiposition of this case.

From the record of both the district

court and the Commission hearing itself, it is clear that the
1988 Battalion Chief's Examination was given in complete
accordance with statutory and constitutional requirements.

It is

also clear that the hearing afforded Collins on his grievance of
the exam was fair, constitutional, and should be upheld.
The District Court properly concluded that the Commission
acted properly in having Jim Christiansen prepare the Battalion
Chief's exam.
practice.

There was no statutory provision against this

Indeed Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-28-3 & -4 allowed for the

Commission to have a secretary who could provide any serivice
that the Commission might require.

The District Court correctly

ruled that Jim Christiansen performed the duites contemplated by
that statute.

Changes to the Fire Civil Service statutes in 1992

offer Collins no grounds to challenge the role of Jim
Christiansen in preparing the exam.
The district court committed no error in finding that the
Commission fulfilled its statutory obligations in administering

the exam.

Collins has presented no evidence whatsoever that the

exam was not a fair test of the requisite skills of the
candidates to the exam. In fact the record of the hearing at the
Commission provides ample evidence to support the conclusion that
the exam was fair.
Furthermore, there was no due process violation in the
Commission hearing Collins7 grievance.

Collins never

specifically points to any particular bias of the Commission
towards his appeal.

To the contrary, when the due process

protections afforded Collins are considered, it is apparent that
there was no bias to Collins in the hearing before the
Commission, and that that hearing complied with all due process
requirements.
Finally, the district court correctly

upheld the decision

of the Commission that the examination was fair.

The district

court correclty ruled that the Commission had susbstantial
evidence on which to base its decision, and ptherefore the
decision should be upheld.

ARGUMENT
I.

The district court correctly determined that the
Commission could properly have Jim Christiansen
prepare the exam.

The testimony was undisputed that Jim Christiansen prepared
the 1988 Battalion Chief's examination on the behalf of the
Commission.

Collins charges that there was no authority for the
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Commission to allow Christiansen to prepare the exam for them.
The district court found that Christiansen was acting for
the Commission in the role of secretary in 1988. (R.

).

This

position was a stautorily defined role, with responsibility for
clerical duties and "such other service as may be required by
such civil service commission." Utah Code Ann. §17-28-4

(1987).

Collins challenges the court's finding on this point based upon
testimony from a retired Civil Service board member, Clare
Rasmussen who stated that Mr. Christiansen did not perform the
secretarial duties for the board.

However, it also must be

remebered that Mr.Rasmussen also believed that Jim Christiansen
was a member of the Board of Commissioners, which he was not.

It

is fair from the record, to assume that the district court took
the clarity of Mr.Rasmussen's memory into consideration when
evaluating his testimony. The trail court's determination of fact
that it appeared that Mr. Christiansen performed the duties of
secretary is entilted to deference by this court.

Dall

v.

State

888 P.2d 680, 685. (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In short, the district court, after hearing evidence and
reviewing the record of the administrative proceeding, found that
Mr. Christiansen performed the duties of secretary to the
Commission in 1988.

Moreover, the language found in Section §17-

28-4 provided ample support for the trial court's decision that
one of the duties contemplated in that section was the
preparation of an exam.

Therefore, this court should uphold that

decision.
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II.

The district court correclty ruled that the
Commission had fulfilled its statutory duty to
conduct a fair exam.

The district court considered evidence from both witnesses
and from the record of the proceeding below in determining that
the Commission properly fulfilled its statutory obligations under
the statute.

The statute requires that the test be fair.

The

district court found, based on the facts presented, that the exam
was fair.

This finding is entitled to deference by this court.

In particular, this finding is entitled to be upheld because
Collins7 has not marshalled any evidence to indicate why the exam
itself was not fair.
The main assertion that Collins makes regarding the fairness
of the exam is restating his first argument concerning the role
of Jim Christiansen in preparing the exam.
this impacts onthe fairness of the exam.

He initimates that
However, there is not

one citation tothe record that this somehow made the exam unfair.
Without some nexus, there is no logical connection between the
two factors.
It is impossible to ascertain any relationship between the
fairness of the exam and the person who prepared it.

Indeed

Collins asserts no evidence on this point whatsoever.
His second assertion under this argument again stems from
his concerns about Jim Christiansen's role in the exam.
Essentially the argument is made that the Commission did not
"give" the exam as required by Utah Code Ann. §78-28-7 (1987).
20

The district court however, found that the Commission did indeed
give the exam.The fact that Mr. Christiansen actually prepared
the exam does not indicate in any way that aanyone other htan the
Commission actually administered it.

Particualrly illuminating

on this point is the fact that the Commission retained
responsibility for the exam, including the determinations of its
adequacy and fairness.

This interpretation is consistent with

what the statutes requied the Commission to do.

Its role was to

insu're the fairness of the examinations. See Utah Code Ann. § 1728-7 (1987). There was no statutory requirement that the members
of the Commission be in anyway experts in the administration of a
technical promotion exam.
III. The trial court correctly ruled that there were no
due process violations in the proceedings before
the Commission.
Collins asks this Court to overrule the trial court's
decision that the proceeding before the Commission were fair and
constitutional. He cites no evidence of any particular instances
of bias or prejudice on the part of the Commission that would
warrant such action.
It is axiomatic that "every person who brings a claim . . .
at a hearing held before an administrative agency has a due
process right to recieve a fair trial in front of a fair
tribunal.

Bunnell

v.

Industrial

Comm'n.,

740 P.2d 1331 (Utah

1987). What Collins neglects to provide this court is any
particular evidence of unfairness or deprivation of due process.
In fact,

review of the record indicates that he was afforded the
21

full panoply of due process protections. He had assistance of
counsel and was entitled to call and cross examine witnesses.
Collins now challenges that the hearing denied him due
process because the Commission responsible for the exam was the
same Commission that heard his grievance.

He makes this argument

"in the abstract, and without specificity, and without any record
citation in support thereof."

Thomas

J.

Peck

&Sonsv.

Pub.

Serv.

Comm'n, 700 P.2d 119, 1123 (Utah 1985) (declining to find due
process violations simply because the administrative law judge
who denied a grievant's application also heard the grievance).
Without any evidence that the proceeding before the Commission
was in fact unfair to Collins, then this Court should not disturb
the decision of the trial court on this issue.
IV.

The district court correctly upheld the decision
of the Commission.

Collins argues that the district court should have
overturned the Commission's finding that the 1988 Battalion
Chief's examination was fair.

However, Collins cites no

compelling support for this argument.

As outlined in the fact

section above, the Commission had ample, reliable evidence upon
which to base its conclusion that the examination was fair.

All

of Collins' allegations were specifically answered by the
Commission with citation to credible evidence in support thereof.

This Court should uphold the Commission's finding that the
exam was fair upheld that decision rests on "substantial
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evidence."

See Hercules

Inc.

169 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

u

v. Utah State

Tax Comm'n,

877 P.2d

'Substantial evidence is 'such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.'"

Grace

Drilling

v.

Board

116 P.2d 63, 68 Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting Idaho
v.

Hunnicutt,

715 P.2d 927, 930 (Idaho 1985)).

of
State

Review,
Ins.

Fund

Moreover, if

there is conflicting evidence, the job of resolving that conflict
is left to the administrative body, not the appellate court.
(Citing Board

of Educ.

of Montgomery

County

v.

Paynter,

Id.

491 A.2d

1186, 1193 (Md. 1985).
In this case, it is apparent that the Commission had
substantial evidence upon which to rely in issuing its finding
that the examination was fair.
Because Collins cannot carry his burden of demonstrating
that there were not substantial facts to support the Commission's
finding that the exam was fair, that decision must be upheld.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission respectfully
requests that this Court uphold the decision of the district
court dismissing Collins' petition.
DATED this

day of January 1997.

DOUGLAS R. SHORT
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
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ADDENDUM
CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (1988)

A-l
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Rule 65B

—Trespass.
Sewer.
Evidence of plaintiffs chain of title and of
the trespass across his farm by defendant's condominium sewer line was sufficient for the issuance of a permanent injunction, and there
was no need to plead or prove that the sewer
line was wrongfully installed. Ferguson v.
Chnstensen, 531 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975)
Jurisdiction.
—Pending appeal.
Motion for injunction to restrain dissipation
of marital assets during the pendency of the
appeal of the divorce action should be filed
with the district court; any jurisdiction Supreme Court may have in such matters should
be invoked only afler a party has sought relief
in the district court, in all but the most exceptional circumstances. Warren v. Warren, 642
P.2d 385 (Utah 1982).
Security.
—Not required.
Unlikelihood of harm.
The trial judge has wide discretion in the
matter of requiring security upon issuance of a
restraining order, and if there is an absence of
proof showing a likelihood of harm, certainly
no bond is necessary. Corporation of President
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Wallace, 673 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1978)
—Recovery of damages.
Demand.
Enjoined party's filing of notice of claim on
bond with district court, stating that the party
intended to assert at some future time its claim
on bond, cannot be deemed to have been a demand on bond upon which the enjoined party
failed to take action precluding it from pursuing a separate action Mountain States Tel. &
Tel Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered,
681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).
Notice.
Fact that this rule eliminates the necessity
of an independent action for damages as a result of an injunction, by providing that liability

on the surety bond "may be enforced on motion
without the necessity of an independent action
on the bond," does not normally eliminate the
necessity of giving the adverse party some notice and an opportunity to meet the issue by
filing a motion or a counterclaim for relief
Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah
1977).
Separate action.
Subdivision (c) of this rule does not preclude
a separate action on an injunction bond;
rather, it allows an action on the bond to be
enforced in the action in which it is filed at the
option of the enjoined party. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).

Wrongfully issued injunction.
If the restraining or enjoinder is not wrong,
ful, the party enjoined has no basis for recovery
on the bond; if, however, it is found that the
injunction was wrongfully issued, the enjoined
party has an action for costs and damages incurred as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d
1258 (Utah 1984).
Damages incurred as a result of wrongfully
issued injunction are limited to the amount of
the bond where the injunction was obtained in
good faith and may include attorney fees of the
party wrongfully enjoined. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).
The award of attorney fees to be paid from an
injunction bond should be limited only to the
hours spent by defendants' counsel as a result
of the wrongfully issued injunction Beard v.
Dugdale, 741 P 2d 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Showing by party sought to be enjoined.
—Operation of nuisance.
A defendant who wants to operate a plant
which has been declared to be a nuisance is
required to offer evidence to the court as to how
the plant can be used without creating a nuisance before he can complain that the court did
not tell him how he could use his plant. Draper
v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244
P.2d 360 (1952).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions
§8 10, 14, 48 to 52, 69 et seq., 265, 296 to 303,
310 to 316.
C.J.S. — 43 C.J S Injunctions §§ 8, 16, 22 to
24, 36 et seq., 165, 166. 180, 206, 208
A.L.R. — Infant's employment contract, enforceability of covenant not to compete in, 17
A.L R 3d 863

Appealability of contempt adjudication or
conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448.
Review other than by appeal or writ of error,
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject
to, 33 A.L.R.3d 589.
Propriety of permanently enjoining one
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in
question, 38 A.L.R.3d 572.

Propriety of injunctive relief against diverof water by municipal corporation or pub£ utility. 42 A.L R.3d 426.
p^jjminary mandatory injunction to preI correct, or reduce effects of polluting
Ilctices, 49 A.L.R.3d 1239.
*What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying
rtftlsal to honor, or injunction against honoru* letter of credit under UCC § 5-114(1), (2),
tf AL.R.4th 239.

Recovery of damages resulting from wrongful issuance of injunction as limited to amount
of bond, 30 A.L.R.4th 273.
Right of employee to injunction preventing
employer from exposing employee to tobacco
smoke in workplace, 37 A.L R 4th 480.
Propriety of federal court injunction against
suit in foreign country, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 831.
Key Numbers. — Injunction •=» 9 et seq.,
143, 148, 150, 189, 190, 204, 213.

Rule 65B. Extraordinary writs.
(a) Special forms of writs abolished. Special forms of pleadings and of
writs in habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are hereby abolished. Where
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by
appropriate action under these rules, on any one of the grounds set forth in
Subdivisions (b) and (0 of this rule.
(b) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted:
(1) where any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, or an office in a
corporation created by the authority of this state; or any public officer,
civil or military, does or permits to be done any act which by the provisions of law works a forfeiture of his office; or an association of persons act
as a corporation within this state without being legally incorporated; or
any corporation has offended against any provision of the law, as it may
have been amended, by or under which law such corporation was created,
altered or renewed; or any corporation has forfeited its privileges and
franchises by nonuser or has committed an act amounting to a surrender
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges and franchises or has
misused a franchise or privilege conferred upon it by law, or exercised a
franchise or privilege not so conferred; or
(2) where an inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; or
(3) where the relief sought is to compel any inferior tribunal, or any
corporation, board or person to perform an act which the law specially
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or to compel the
admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully excluded by such inferior
tribunal or by such corporation, board or person; or
(4) where the relief sought is to arrest the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board or person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person.
(c) Action by attorney general under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule.
The attorney general may, and when directed so to do by the governor shall,
commence any action authorized by the provisions of Subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule. Such action shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah.
(d) Action by private person under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. A
person claiming to be entitled to a public or private office unlawfully held and
exercised by another may bring an action therefor. A private person may
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bring an action upon any other ground set forth in Subdivision (b)(1) of ttoj
rule, only if the attorney general fails to do so after notice. Any such action
commenced by a private person shall be brought in his own name. Upon filjhi
the complaint, such person shall also file an undertaking with sufficient sure!
ties, in the same form required of bonds on appeal under the provision of RujJ
73 and conditioned that such person will pay any judgment for costs or dam.
ages recovered against him in such action.
(e) Nature and extent of relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
Upon the filing of a complaint seeking relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this
rule, the court may require notice to be given to the adverse party before
issuance of the writ, or may grant an order to show cause why such writ'
should not be issued, or may grant the writ without notice. If the writ ia
granted, it shall be directed to the inferior tribunal, board, or officer, or to any
other person having the custody of the record or proceedings, commanding
such tribunal, board or officer to certify fully to the court issuing the writ,
within a specified time, a transcript of the record and proceedings, describing
or referring to them with sufficient certainty; and if a stay of proceedings U
intended, requiring the party in the meantime to desist from further proceedings in the matter to be reviewed. The review by the court issuing the writ
shall not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal,
board or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board or
officer.
(f) Habeas corpus. Appropriate relief by habeas corpus proceedings shall
be granted whenever it appears to the proper court that any person is unjustly
imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty. If the person seeking relief
is imprisoned in the penitentiary and asserts that in the proceedings which
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under
the Constitution of the United States or under the Constitution of the state of
Utah, or both, then the person seeking such relief shall proceed in accordance
with Rule 65B(i). In all other cases, proceedings under this subdivision shall
be conducted in accordance with the following provisions:
(1) The complaint seeking relief shall, among other things, state that
the person designated is illegally restrained of his liberty by the defendant and the place where he is so restrained, if known (stating wherein
and the cause or pretense thereof, according to the best information of the
plaintiff, annexing a copy of any legal process or giving a satisfactory
explanation for failing so to do); that the legality of the imprisonment or
restraint has not already been adjudged upon a prior proceeding; whether
another complaint for the same relief has been filed and relief thereunder
denied by any court, and if so attaching a copy of such complaint and
stating the reasons for the denial of relief or giving satisfactory reasons
for the failure to do so.
(2) The complaint shall be filed in the court most convenient to the
plaintiff.
(3) Upon the filing of the complaint the court shall, unless it appears
from such complaint or the showing of the plaintiff that he is not entitled
to any relief, issue a writ directed to the defendant commanding him to
bring the person alleged to be restrained before the court at a time and
place therein specified, at which time the court shall proceed in a summary manner to hear the matter and render judgment accordingly. If the
writ is not issued the court shall state its reasons therefor in writing and
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file the same with the complaint, and shall deliver a copy thereof to the
plaintiff.
(4) If the defendant cannot be found, or if he does not have such person
in custody, the writ (and any other process issued) may be served upon
any one having such person in custody, in the manner and with the same
effect as if he had been made defendant in the action.
(5) If the defendant conceals himself, or refuses admittance to the person attempting to serve the writ, or if he attempts wrongfully to carry the
person imprisoned or restrained out of the county or state after service of
the writ, the person serving the writ shall immediately arrest the defendant, or other person so resisting, and bring him, together with the person
designated in the writ, forthwith before the court before which the writ is
made returnable.
(6) At the time of the issuance of the writ, the court may, if it appears
that the person designated will be carried out of the jurisdiction of the
court or will suffer some irreparable injury before compliance with the
writ can be enforced, cause a warrant to issue, reciting the facts, and
directing the sheriff to take such person and forthwith bring him before
the court to be dealt with according to law.
(7) The defendant shall appear at the proper time and place with the
person designated or show good cause for not doing so and must answer
the complaint within the time allowed. The answer must state plainly
and unequivocally whether he then has, or at any time has had, the
person designated under his control and restraint, and if so, the cause
thereof. If such person has been transferred, the defendant must state
that fact, and to whom, when the transfer was made, and the reason or
authority therefor. The writ shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form
or misdescription of the person restrained or defendant, if enough is
stated to show the meaning and intent thereof.
(8) The person restrained may waive his right to be present at the
hearing, in which case the writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a
determination of the matter the court may place such person in the custody of such individual or individuals as may be deemed proper.
(g) [Deleted.]
(h) When writ returnable. Any alternative writ issued by a court or a
judge thereof, may be made returnable, and a hearing thereon may be had, at
any time as such court may in its discretion determine,
(i) Postconviction hearings.
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary or county jail under a
commitment of any court, whether such imprisonment be under an original commitment or under a commitment for violation of probation or
parole, who asserts that in any proceedings which resulted in his commitment there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution
of the United States or of the state of Utah, or both, may institute a
proceeding under this rule.
Such proceedings shall be commenced by filing a complaint, together
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the court in which such relief is
sought. The complainant shall also serve a copy of the complaint so filed
upon the attorney general of the state of Utah if imprisoned in the state
prison, or the county attorney of the county where imprisoned if in 8
county jail. Such service may be made by any of the methods provided foi
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service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or by mailing such
copy to the attorney general or county attorney by United States mail
postage prepaid, and by filing with the clerk of said court a certificate of
mailing certifying under oath that a copy was so mailed to the attorney
general or county attorney. Upon the filing of such a complaint, the clerk
shall promptly bring the same to the attention of the presiding judge of
the court in which such complaint is filed.
(2) The complaint shall state that the person seeking relief is illegally
restrained of his liberty by the defendant; shall state the place where he
is so restrained; shall state the dates of and identify the proceedings in
which the complainant was convicted and by which he was subsequently
confined and of which he now complains; and shall set forth in plain and
concise terms the factual data constituting each and every manner in
which the complainant claims that any constitutional rights were violated. The complaint shall have attached thereto affidavits, copies of
records, or other evidence supporting such allegations, or shall state why
the same are not attached.
The complaint shall also state whether or not the judgment of conviction that resulted in the confinement complained of has been reviewed on
appeal, and if so, shall identify such appellate proceedings and state the
results thereof.
The complaint shall further state that the legality or constitutionality
of his commitment or confinement has not already been adjudged in a
prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding; and if the complainant
shall have instituted prior similar proceedings in any court, state or federal, within the state of Utah, he shall so state in his complaint, shall
attach a copy of any pleading filed in such court by him to his complaint,
and shall set forth the reasons for the denial of relief in such other court.
In such case, if it is apparent to the court in which the proceeding under
this rule is instituted that the legality or constitutionality of his confinement has already been adjudged in such prior proceedings, the court shall
forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving written notice thereof by mail to
the complainant, and no further proceedings shall be had on such complaint.
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of authorities shall not be set
forth in the complaint, but may be set out in a separate supporting memorandum or brief if the complainant so desires.
(4) All claims of the denial of any of complainant's constitutional rights
shall be raised in the postconviction proceeding brought under this rule
and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding except for good
cause shown therein.
(5) If the complainant is not represented by counsel when the complaint is filed, he shall advise the court upon filing his complaint whether
he intends to employ his own counsel, and if he does not do so, or if he
requests the court to appoint counsel, the presiding judge shall forthwith
appoint counsel to represent complainant and shall give notice to the
complainant and the attorney general or county attorney of such appointment.
(6) Within ten days after service of a copy of the complaint upon him,
the attorney general, or the county attorney, as the case may be, shall
answer the complaint or otherwise plead thereto. Any further pleadings
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or amendments shall be in conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(7) When an answer is filed, the court shall immediately set the case
for a hearing within twenty days thereafter unless the court in its discretion determines that further time is needed. Prior to the hearing, the
state or county shall obtain such transcript of proceedings or court records
as may be relevant and material to the case. The court, on its own motion,
or upon the request of either party, may order a prehearing conference if
good reason exists therefor; but such conference shall not be set so as to
unreasonably delay the hearing on the merits of the complaint. The complainant shall be brought before the court for any hearing or conference.
If the court in which the complaint is filed determines that in the
interest of convenience and economy, the hearing should be transferred to
the district court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement of
complainant, the court may enter a written order transferring such case
and shall set forth in such order its reasons for so doing.
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining the case, shall enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment, in writing, and
the same shall be made a part of the record in the case.
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former
roceedings and such further orders with respect to rearraignment, retrial,
custody, bail or discharge as the court may deem just and proper in the
case.
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings, he
may proceed in forma pauperis upon the filing of an affidavit to that
effect, in which event the court may direct the costs to be paid by the
county in which he was originally charged.
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such complaint may be appealed
to and reviewed by the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in civil cases.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1985).
Amendment Notes. — Subdivision (g), relating to proceedings where extraordinary
writs are sought in the Supreme Court, was
repealed with the adoption of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure (now the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court), effective January I,
1985. For present provisions, see Rules 19 and
20 R. Utah S Ct. and, particularly, the Committee Note following Rule 20.
Compiler's Notes. - There .s no federal
rule covering the subject matter contained in
this rule, except for Rule 81(a)(2), F.R.C.P..

which applies the federal rules to proceedings
for habeas corpus.
The federal statute governing remedies on
motion attacking sentence appears at 28
U S C. § 2255.
Cross-Referencea. - Corporations, Title
^g
S t a t u t e o f U m i t a t i o n 8 f o r h a b e a 8 ^^^
ac.
lion, § 78-12-31.1.
limitations for vpostconviction re.. . §. __
0
h e f actlon
« 78-12-31.2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Abolishment of special forms.
—Mandamus.
—Nature of present remedy.
Grounds
—•Certiorari.
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